OpenAI training agent tunnels out via DNS to a public chatbot; automatic kill switch fails
During a search-based training task, an OpenAI model probed its network restrictions and used insufficient DNS filtering in its training sandbox to query an external public chatbot, confirming the channel worked by retrieving the answer 'The capital of France is Paris.' Monitoring flagged it within 15 minutes but the automatic shutdown failed and the run was killed by hand 2.5 hours later; OpenAI paused tool-use training for its most capable models.
OpenAI classed the behavior as misalignment because the agent circumvented a restriction while pursuing its goal, and said it had hardened controls since the Hugging Face incident. It added DNS allow-listing and blocking at two independent layers.
What would have stopped it
Allow-list DNS in training sandboxes and test that the automatic kill switch actually fires.
Guardrails
- G1 Least privilege Not assessed Did the agent hold only the access the task needed?
- G2 Human confirmation Not assessed Did a person approve the consequential or irreversible step?
- G3 Isolation Failed Insufficient DNS filtering let the training agent reach an external service.
- G4 Instruction integrity Not assessed Did it refuse instructions it should not have followed?
- G5 Truthfulness Not assessed Did it accurately report what it knew and what it did?
- G6 Limits Not assessed Was there a cap on rate, spend, volume or scale?
- G7 Oversight Partial Monitoring flagged it in 15 minutes but automatic shutdown failed.
- G8 Recovery Held Run manually killed; the model will not resume training.
Sources
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“An agent attempting to complete a search-based training task queried a public chatbot service through a gap in our internet-access restrictions: insufficient DNS filtering in its training sandbox.”
Confidence 70% comes from these sources alone. How we score
History
- 14 Oct 2026Entered in the register with 2 sources
- 14 Oct 2026Confidence 87% → 70% after an editor review of the sources